Physical Metaphor and Abstract Thought

We use metaphors drawn from physical experience to structure our abstract thoughts. These are strongly correlated with the conceptual forms each meme likes to use.

The use of metaphors drawn from physical experiences lags well behind the onset of the experiences themselves. It seems that we must first develop a high degree of familiarity and expertise with the physical experiences, and we then apply the patterns learned there in our abstract mental processes.

Blue's favorite metaphor drawn from physical experience is presence/absence -- either a thing is here or it isn't, I perceive it or I don't. The same structure, when used to structure abstract thought, results in blue's dichotomous thinking: an action or idea is either right or it is not. Using this particular metaphor, black is the absence of white, wrongness is the absence of rightness, softness is the absence of loudness, liberalism is the absence of conservatism (or vice versa, in each case.)

Orange's favorite sort of physical metaphors are drawn from object relations, such as containment ('in'), support ('on'), and distance ('to'). When used abstractly, 'in' results in categorization (putting different items in different boxes), 'on' results in notions of dependence (one idea is built on another), and 'to' results in spectra, with change in a quality being conceptualized as distance or progress (any point between A and B is some of the way from A to B.)

Green's favorite physical metaphor is figure/ground -- where and how I perceive object boundaries determines what I see as the focus and what I see as the background. This same structure, abstracted, results in green's contextual thinking: the appearance or meaning of a thing depends on how its boundaries are defined and what context it appears in. The metaphorical mapping equates my abstract "perspective" (including experiences, abilities, beliefs, and so on) with my physical perspective (including location, ability to see, and so on.)

The sequence of these metaphors is not accidental. At any given stage of physical growth, our bodily capabilities restrict the sorts of experiences we can have, and our bodies do not skip stages of development. As a result, the physical experiences these metaphors are drawn from happen in a certain sequence, and always in that sequence. Since we can see, hear, smell, taste, and touch well before we develop decent motor control, we have lots of experience with sensed presence/absence before we experiment with object manipulation and learn object relations such as in, on, and between. And only with experience in object relations do we encounter situations where perspective and the distinction between foreground and background makes a difference. The sequence of our conceptual forms seems to mirror the sequence of our physical development and our progressively more complex engagement with the world.